Yet HIV/AIDS is not evenly distributed but heavily concentrated in the poorest regions of the world. Almost two-thirds of HIV-infected people live in subSaharan Africa, whereas only some 4 percent live in the OECD countries. This stark difference is magnified by the fact that the distribution of resourcesboth HIV/AIDS-specific and in general terms -is the reverse (Siplon, 2007: 28) .
Finally, it has become increasingly apparent that HIV/AIDS is a political issue, and that politics, not medicine, holds the key to effective responses to the pandemic (cf. Poku and Whiteside, 2006: 249; Patterson, 2007: 217) . Highlighting the key role of politics in public health, AIDS has drawn attention to the many different policy sectors and actors that need to cooperate in order to fight the pandemic (Kickbusch, 2007: xi) .
All these characteristics of HIV/AIDS make it amenable to cooperation and conflict among a wide variety of actors at all levels -international, transnational, regional, national and local. More specifically, the AIDS issue appears to be an obvious candidate for public-private partnerships (PPPs). In the following, I shall, first, trace the development of the international response to the pandemic from the designation of the World Health Organization (WHO) as "lead agency" in the late 1980s to the emergence of a variety of PPPs from the 1990s onwards. This trajectory will be related to general trends in global public health governance. After exploring the reasons behind their rise, I shall describe and typify existing PPPs. Finally, the legitimacy and democratic qualities of today's global governance arrangements in the fight against AIDS will be discussed in terms of coordination, representation and accountability.
WHO is in charge?
The reaction of the global political community to the HIV/AIDS epidemic was belated. A global offensive, involving governments and international organizations, was launched only in 1987, some five years after public health officials realized that a new disease was spreading. Early in that "year of global AIDS mobilization" (Panos, 1988: 94) the World Health Organization (WHO) initiated its Special Programme on AIDS, later known as the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA).
Governments and other international organizations promptly endorsed the WHO initiative. In October, AIDS was discussed by the UN General Assembly, the first time a specific disease was considered by that forum. Its resolution confirmed "the established leadership and the essential global directing and coordinating role" of WHO (cf. Gordenker et al., 1995: 40) .
Despite virtually universal endorsement initially and despite serious efforts at creating structures for coordinating UN agencies, donor countries and NGOs, GPA ran into a variety of problems in relation to other actors on the international scene. Whereas contributions to GPA increased significantly in the first few years, by 1991 they started declining, as donor governments started questioning the results of the program and shifted toward bilateral funding (Mann et al., 1992) . GPA Director Jonathan Mann, who had directed a collaborative field research project on AIDS in Zaire prior to being recruited to WHO, was convinced that NGOs needed to be included in all aspects of the policy process. However, despite several attempts, no sustainable coordinating body could be established (cf. Gordenker et al., 1995: 89-108; Söderholm, 1997: 160-64) . As it became evident that HIV/AIDS was a problem with no medical solution in sight, other UN agencies, such as UNDP and UNICEF claimed equally valid expertise and came to question WHO's role as lead agency. The World Bank had begun to make direct loans for health services, promoting "structural adjustment" measures, at the very time that the HIV/AIDS epidemic erupted. While controversial, the Bank's loans for health surpassed WHO's total budget by 1990 (Brown et al., 2006: 67-68) .
A critical external review of GPA, delivered in January 1992, recommended the establishment of a new global coordinative mechanism. After a series of interagency negotiations and donor country meetings, WHO and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1994 endorsed the launching of a new joint and cosponsored UN program by January 1996.
The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, known by the acronym UNAIDS, is designed to coordinate the HIV/AIDS-related programs of UN agencies. In addition to the cosponsors -the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), WHO and the World Bank -representatives of 22 governments from all geographical regions and 5 NGO representatives, including associations of PLWHA, form its Program Coordinating Board (PCB). Thus, UNAIDS can be said to be the first PPP in this area.
Initially UNAIDS lacked funding, staff and support from key states, such as the United States and Britain. By building a solid base of scientific studies of HIV prevalence and successful AIDS programs, UNAIDS contributed to renewing global interest in the pandemic (Patterson, 2007: 208) . In January 2000 the UN Security Council, under US presidency, for the first time debated AIDS as a global security threat. In July the G8 summit in Okinawa adopted the "Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative," which identified HIV/AIDS as a formidable challenge for global development in the new millennium. In September the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one of which is to "combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases," with a target of having "halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS."
The turn of the century marked a turning-point in terms of global attention and commitment. In June 2001 the UN General Assembly held a special session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS), the first time such a session had been convened to discuss a health issue. UNGASS adopted, by consensus, a Declaration of Commitment entitled "Global Crisis − Global Action." While reaffirming a broad commitment to international action, the meeting also reflected lingering taboos in government responses to the pandemic (cf. Altman, 2006) . The most disputed issue was whether or not to name specific groups, such as sex workers, male homosexuals or injection drug users, as particularly affected by and vulnerable to HIV. Early drafts of the declaration that included such references were resisted by the United States and a number of Middle Eastern states and had to be dropped despite the support of the European Union and several states (Csete, 2007: 248) .
UNGASS concluded with a commitment to set up a global trust fund, as suggested by UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan at an African summit on HIV/AIDS in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2001. While the idea originated with the economist Jeffrey Sachs and WHO civil servants, Annan "used his high-profile position to campaign for its creation and to solicit initial donations" (Patterson, 2007: 216) . At their summit in Genoa in July, all G8 heads of state affirmed their support for the global fund and expressed their determination to make it operational as soon as possible. Malaria and tuberculosis were added to the mandate of the grant-making organization as a result of pressure from the EU (Bull and McNeill, 2007: 79) .
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) was designed as a grant-making organization, funding proposals following technical review, with continued support tied to performance. At the insistence of some G8 countries, especially the US and Japan, it was to stand apart from and operate outside the UN system that was considered inefficient and bureaucratic (Bartsch, 2007: 149; Lisk, 2008: 149) . A unique governance model was adopted: in addition to an equal number of government representatives from industrialized and developing countries, NGO representatives from developed and developing countries as well as privatesector representatives are included on the Fund's governing board. In January 2002 the Global Fund was constituted as an independent Swiss foundation with its secretariat in Geneva, and three months later the first round of grants were approved. Thus, another PPP was born outside the UN family.
A major factor contributing to the renewed attention to HIV/AIDS around the turn of the millennium was the development in the 1990s of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which reduce the viral load and allow HIV-infected people to return to a healthier state. The pressure on pharmaceutical companies to reduce their prices to make these drugs available in poor countries mounted. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was one arena of this struggle, as pharmaceutical products fall under the 1994 TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. The underlying issue was "the limits to be placed on free trade in order to protect health and life" (Beigbeder, 2007: 195) . Another part of the controversy took place in individual countries with high HIV incidence. Clashes in South Africa and Brazil had an impact on world public opinion and forced pharmaceuticals to retreat (see, e.g., von Soest and Weinel, 2007; Calcagnotto, 2007; de Mello e Souza, 2007) . The access campaign ""pitted a transnational network of NGOs against a transnational network of pharmaceutical firms" (Sell and Prakash, 2004: 160 (Seckinelgin, 2008: 27-28; Patterson, 2007: 212) .Unlike the previous PPPs, the initiative for establishing AAI came from the pharmaceutical industry (Bull and McNeill, 2007: 81) .
Whereas the development of life-sustaining drugs for HIV/AIDS patients constitutes a major step forward, the search for a vaccine continues. Current HIV prevention and treatment efforts help curbing the epidemic, but an effective vaccine remains the best long-term means to halt the spread of HIV. This is another facet of the pandemic that has spawned PPPs. The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), founded in 1996, is described as "a global notfor-profit, public-private partnership working to accelerate the development of a vaccine to prevent HIV infection and AIDS" (www.iavi.org). It engages in research, policy analysis, partnering with developing countries and advocacy. Policy advocacy partners include WHO and UNAIDS as well as the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS and the International Council of AIDS Service Organizations; and scientific collaborators include British, Indian, and South African Medical Research Councils as well as the US National Institutes of Health.
Yet another PPP has been established in the same area. The Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise is an alliance of researchers, funders and advocates committed to accelerating the development of an HIV vaccine. Based on an initiative from researchers in 2003, the Enterprise is modeled in part on the Human Genome project, the alliance of scientific organizations that successfully mapped the human genetic code (www.hivvaccineenterprise.org). Both the Enterprise and IAVI have headquarters in New York City.
The number of global health PPPs including the pharmaceutical industry has mushroomed in the new millennium. In the HIV/AIDS field these include industry-based partnerships, such as Abbott Access to HIV Care, the Diflucan Partnership Program (Pfizer) and GlaxoSmithKline's Positive Action on HIV/AIDS; scientifically-based partnerships, such as the Enhancing Care Initiative (ECI), coordinated by the Harvard AIDS Institute; partnerships focusing on women, such as the International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM) and Women's Global Health Imperative; and partnerships focusing on children and families, such as Children & Families Affected by AIDS and Secure the Future (see Matlin, 2006: 25) .
Why partnerships?
The trajectory described above with regard to HIV/AIDS reflects a general trend in global public health governance. Until the late 1970s, public-private collaboration was minimal. "Health for All," the catchword in the declaration of a major international health conference in Alma Ata in 1978, was adopted as a strategy by WHO's World Health Assembly in 1981. It reflected a socialdemocratic agenda for global governance, emphasizing public-sector relationships between donor agencies and recipient state governments. During the 1980s WHO lost ground to the World Bank, which favored greater reliance on private-sector health care provision and reduced public involvement in health services delivery. As civil society played a key role in its vision of "good governance," the World Bank also linked up with NGOs, establishing an NGO-World Bank committee in 1982 and a central NGO Unit in the mid1980s (cf. Buse and Walt, 2000a: 550-51; Thomas and Weber, 2004: 189-94; Brown et al., 2006: 67-68) .
If the World Bank's early structural adjustment programs had given primary attention to macroeconomic policies, the 1990s saw a growing realization that improved health conditions in poor countries constitutes a precondition for economic growth (Hein et al.: 2007b: 226) . Thus, as poverty reduction came back on the global agenda, culminating in the adoption of the Millennium Goals, public health was framed in socioeconomic rather than purely medical terms. This opened up for "multi-stakeholder diplomacy" (Lisk, 2008: 147) , allowing non-state actors -not only traditional NGOs, but also business, private donors and AIDS activists -into emergent new structures of global governance. WHO, under the new Director General, Gro Harlem Brundtland, took an active part in organizing PPPs concentrating on specific targets. Within a few years around the turn of the millennium, some 70 "global health partnerships" were established. Philanthropic foundations often took the lead in the creation of partnerships, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation became a significant player, which has granted billions of dollars to prevent or eliminate diseases in poor countries (cf. Matlin, 2006; Brown et al., 2006: 70; Bull and McNeill, 2007: 76-77) .
A number of contextual changes paved the way for the emergence of PPPs in international cooperation for health since the late 1990s (cf. Buse and Walt, 2000a: 551-52) . First, there was an ideological shift, insofar as the neoliberal focus on "freeing" the market gave way to neocorporatist notions of "modifying" the market and granting a variety of stakeholders a legitimate say in public policy-making. This shift was reflected, for instance, in new World Bank policies. In the words of one World Bank official, "where drugs are concerned, a pure market mechanism generally does not work… we are therefore not really speaking of creating a pure market situation, but a modified market mechanism incorporating a whole series of safeguards to protect all the parties concerned" (quoted in Buse and Walt, 2000a: 551) .
Second, growing disillusionment with the UN and its agencies created fertile ground for new organizational forms. Partnerships to deal with specific and limited issues were seen as a way to surmount the overlapping mandates and interagency competition in the UN family. Donors, who had imposed a policy of real zero growth in UN budgets, preferred voluntary and earmarked funding through PPPs. Some observers see PPPs as a move away from the "big plans" of traditional international agencies toward "visible piecemeal steps" (Kickbusch, 2005: 970) .
Third, a new perspective on health evolved, with increasing recognition that the determinants of good health are wide-ranging. Hence, the global health agenda came to be regarded as too extensive for any single sector or organization to tackle it alone. As emerging health problems, such as HIV/AIDS, required a range of responses beyond the capacity of either public or private actors working independently, bridge-building became necessary.
Fourth, technological and market changes have highlighted the interdependence between public and private sectors. New developments in biotechnology, along with the international codification of intellectual property rights, have made the discovery and development of vaccines and drugs increasingly expensive. To provide drugs and vaccines to poor countries at an affordable price, public and private decision-makers need to join forces.
Finally, globalization may have provided incentives for private-sector actors to enter into partnerships with the UN and its agencies. Whereas the rules of the game for the market economy were previously laid down by national governments, now they have to be applied globally to be effective. Corporate social responsibility has become a worldwide formula, and the UN Global Compact, initiated in 1999, constitutes a widely recognized framework for responsible industrial activities around the world.
Public-private partnerships in the fight against HIV/AIDS
As in other sectors, there is no commonly accepted definition of a PPP in global health. The terms partnership and partner suffer from a lack of specificity, and PPPs may take various forms. The common denominator is that they are hybrid organizations involving both public and private actors on a voluntary basis. In addition, PPPs seem to share four characteristics: a common goal, an explicit division of labor, shared risks and benefits, and some form of joint decision-making (cf. Buse, 2005: 192) .
According to an authoritative definition, health PPPs may be understood as "arrangements that innovatively combine different skills and resources from institutions in the public and private sectors to address pertinent global health problems" (quoted in Sundaram and Holm, 2006: 1; Bull and McNeill, 2007: 66) . Different typologies of PPPs in global health generally, and HIV/AIDS in particular, have been suggested. In terms of functions, four different types may be distinguished. Research and development partnerships are involved in the discovery and development of new drugs and vaccines. Technical assistance partnerships support improved access to medical services, for example, discounted or donated drugs. Advocacy partnerships seek to elevate the pandemic on the global agenda and press for increased action and resource mobilization. Financing partnerships provide funds for specific programs (Bull and McNeill, 2007: 66) . As we shall see, these distinctions are not mutually exclusive, as individual PPPs often combine different functions.
PPPs can also be categorized by organizational form. For example, an "elite committee model" represents relatively equal partners who arrive at decision by consensus. Rather than implementing decisions, the committee encourages individual members to influence the behaviour of their respective organizations. The Global Business Network on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which involves leaders of major companies as well as UN, government and NGO partners, is one example of this model. An "NGO model" involves a relationship between partners based on delegation, linking public and private actors through resource transfers. Several PPPs, including the Global Fund, belong to this category. A "quasi-public authority model" depicts PPPs created by public sector actors, designed to provide goods and services or enable private actors to enter a market. The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative exemplifies this model. While suggestive, this typology is not exhaustive. For example, it does not take into account PPPs where the private sector is the dominant partner (Buse and Walt, 2000b: 700) .
Other categorizations have been suggested. Suffice it to note that there is no definitive typology that captures the wide variety and complexity of PPPs in the HIV/AIDS area. In addition to those PPPs already mentioned, a great number of organizational players that are hard to define and categorize have emerged in recent decades. For instance, the International AIDS Society (IAS) is a membership-based association of HIV/AIDS professionals. Promoting dialogue, education and networking and organizing the biennial International AIDS Conferences, IAS counts publishers and the Kaiser Family Foundation among its partners. The Global HIV Prevention Working Group (PWG) is an international panel of more than 50 leading public health experts, clinicians, biomedical and behavioral researchers, advocates and PLWHA, convened by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Kaiser Family Foundation.
The Global AIDS Alliance is an advocacy organization, seeking to activate groups that have not been engaged in HIV/AIDS but work on related issues. Its partners include a broad array of civil society actors, including faith-based organizations and humanitarian and relief agencies. Another PPP with a confusingly similar name, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance is a global partnership of nationally-based organizations working to support community action on AIDS in developing countries.
The list could be made much longer; but rather than trying to list and describe all AIDS-related PPPs, I shall take a closer look at the two most prominent ones, UNAIDS and the Global Fund, zeroing in on governance structures and partnership arrangements.
UNAIDS
Meant to remedy the shortcomings of WHO's Global Program on AIDS (GPA), UNAIDS at the same time built on the early GPA experiences. Donor governments had become increasingly critical of GPA, which they saw as hamstrung by its position within WHO and incapable of coordinating UN agencies in the development of a common global strategy. Moreover, despite GPA's all efforts, the gap between the rate of new infections and initial strategic expectations had grown ever wider (Altman, 1999; Poku, 2004: 98) . Representing a departure from traditional notions of "lead agencies," UNAIDS can be seen as a new kind of entity in the UN family, insofar as it unites several UN organizations -six at its creation, ten at present -with the explicit objective to coordinate the UN system's response to the HIV/AIDS challenge (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 136-37) . Skeptics, including former GPA Director Jonathan Mann, compared this task to "walking six cats on a leash" (Poku, 2004: 98) .
Whereas GPA put a lot of effort into mobilizing donor governments to support a multilateral response to the epidemic, the co-sponsoring UN agencies decided that UNAIDS would not be a funding agency but was to have a more pronounced advocacy role (Poku, 2004: 98) . In a sense, it is therefore more political than GPA. "UNAIDS advocacy was exemplified at the 2001 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS, as UNAIDS officials provided needed information to country delegations and built political support for the final Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS" (Patterson, 2007: 208) .
A crucial element of continuity from GPA to UNAIDS concerns the important role assigned to NGOs. GPA contributed to recognition of NGOs as legitimate counterparts and encouraged the development of such networks as the International Council of AIDS Service Organizations (ICASO), the Global Network of People Living with AIDS (GNP Plus) and the International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS (ICW) (Altman, 1999; Poku, 2004: 97) . Whereas GPA's liaison with the NGO community remained informal, UNAIDS allowed NGOs into its formal decision-making body, a novelty among UN programs (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 137) . The NGO delegation on the Program Coordinating Board (PCB) consists of five representatives and five alternates and includes associations of PLWHA. Representing Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Latin America/Caribbean and North America, the delegates have non-voting status.
In addition, UNAIDS counts several NGOs as partners. For instance, it has established partnerships with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in efforts to reduce AIDS-related stigmatization and discrimination, with Caritas Internationalis to engage Catholic Churchsponsored organizations, and with parliamentarians through the International Parliamentary Union. Some of its partners have been created by UNAIDS itself, including the Global Coalition on Women and AIDS, launched in 2004, as well as a number of international celebrities who serve as UNAIDS Special Representatives. While less developed, partnerships with the business sector are actively promoted by UNAIDS. One example is the partnership with MTV in the youth education "Staying Alive" campaign (www.unaids.org).
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)
GFATM describes itself as "a financial instrument, not an implementing agency." In formal terms, it is a foundation registered under Swiss law. Yet it enjoys unique status as an international legal personality with privileges and immunities similar to those granted to IGOs. Whereas the Fund is thus not a member of the UN family, the World Bank serves as its trustee, responsible for the collection, investment and management of funds, disbursement of funds to recipient countries and programs, and financial reporting (Panos, 2003: 31) .
The hybrid character of GFATM is reflected in the composition of its board. It consists of five types of constituencies: donor states, recipient states, civil society, private sector, and bilateral/multilateral agencies. These are sorted into two voting groups -a donor group and a recipient group -as well as one nonvoting group. Eight representatives from industrialized states and two representatives from the private sector (one company, one foundation) constitute the donor group. In the recipient group are seven representatives from developing states and three civil society representatives (one north, one south, one affected communities). The non-voting group consists of three IGO representatives from WHO, UNAIDS and the World Bank, as well as a Swiss member. Whereas government seats in the donor group are allocated on the basis of pledges to the Fund, the selection of other members is left to their respective regionally defined constituencies.
Initially associations of affected communities belonged to the non-voting group, but eventually succeeded in their quest for voting status. To restore the balance between the two voting groups, the number of donor state seats then increased from seven to eight, thereby reducing the relative weight of developing states. The power imbalance is underlined by the fact that the two most important committees preparing board meetings, the Policy and Strategy Committee and the Finance and Audit Committee, are chaired by donor group representatives. The board normally operates by consensus; if this fails, a double majority, in absolute terms and within each voting group, is required (Bartsch, 2007: 152) .
As a global public-private partnership, the Global Fund strives to encourage similar consensus-building and dialogues between civil society, the private sector and government representatives in applicant countries. To apply for grants, a country must set up a Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), composed of representatives from governments, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, and business (Patterson, 2007: 215-16 ). The CCM is regarded as an essential structure of the Fund's architecture, designed to reflect its commitment to local ownership, recipient-driven strategies and broad participation (Panos, 2003: 30; Lisk, 2008: 149) .
While taking different forms in recipient states, CCM structures have typically run into a number of problems. They tend to be government-dominated, with token civil society representation. Even when formal representation is given to civil society organizations, practical constraints often inhibit their full participation. The role of CCMs is well defined in the preparation of a proposal, but is more ambiguous in the implementation phase after a grant is given (Bartsch, 2007: 156) . Because of limited resources and capacities, many CCMs seek outside assistance from international organizations, such as WHO, UNAIDS and the World Bank, in developing and writing proposals to the Fund (Panos, 2003: 31; Bartsch and Kohlmorgen, 2007: 132) , which tends to dilute notions of local initiative and ownership.
In sum, both UNAIDS and the Global Fund display complex governance structures, ascribing varying formal status to private actors. Whereas NGOs are unequal partners without voting rights in UNAIDS, they have equal status on the GFATM board where, on the other hand, UN agencies are non-voting partners. Partnership with the business sector appears to be project-based in the case of UNAIDS, while GFATM grants formal representation on its board.
Finally, no overview of PPPs in the HIV/AIDS field would be complete without paying attention to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It is a major contributor to, and has a seat on the board of, the Global Fund as well as the international AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI); and in 2002 it participated in launching the Global HIV Prevention Working Group (PWG), an international panel of more than 50 leading public health experts, clinicians, biomedical and behavioral researchers, advocates and people affected by HIV/AIDS. Its purpose is to inform global policy-making, program planning and donor decisions on HIV prevention.
While other private foundations are active in HIV/AIDS partnerships -for instance, the Rockefeller Foundation fostered the creation of IAVI (Matlin, 2006: 13) -the Gates Foundation differs not only in the magnitude of its grants to partnerships, but also by virtue of its less bureaucratic, "hands on" management style and its concern to bring new technology to developing countries. These features make partnerships more attractive to the main proprietors of new technology, the big pharmaceutical companies. Thus, the Gates Foundation has been instrumental in bringing different parties together (Bull and McNeill, 2007: 89) .
Legitimacy questions
Public-private partnerships are relatively new phenomena on the global scene. How legitimate are they in a world where multilateralism has traditionally been equated with interstate cooperation? There are basically two ways of legitimizing PPPs: in terms of either effectiveness or stakeholder democracy. The first type of legitimacy claim rests on the assumptions that most global problems require coordinated action, that interstate cooperation is insufficient, and that PPPs can achieve the needed coordination among a variety of relevant actors. The other legitimacy claim is that the inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders in PPPs contributes to diminishing the "democratic deficit," by making the governance of global issues more representative and accountable. Accordingly, I shall discuss legitimacy questions bearing specifically on PPPs in the HIV/AIDS field under the rubrics of coordination, representation and accountability.
Coordination
The fight against AIDS requires coordination both horizontally (between different actors at the global level) and vertically (between actors at the global and the national or local level). Both have proven to be problematic.
On the positive side, the process leading to the UN General Assembly's special session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) in 2001 is arguably an example of successful horizontal coordination.
The process of convincing the General Assembly to call for the special session, negotiating the draft declaration before UNGASS, and gaining unanimous support for the declaration at UNGASS required country delegates, UNAIDS officials, and NGO representatives to listen to each other and compromise. … UN civil servants, in conjunction with public health experts and AIDS NGOs, acted as knowledge brokers and intermediaries between member states. (Patterson, 2007: 211) However, the process was probably more important and successful than the end product. A follow-up UN General Assembly High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS in 2006 noted the lack of progress in the global response since the 2001 Declaration, which was attributed to governance-related factors, such as weak leadership and commitment (Lisk, 2008: 146-47) .
UNAIDS was designed to coordinate UN agencies. Yet its co-sponsors have continued to conduct their own policies and programs. As they have surrendered little of their autonomy, duplication and rivalry persist (cf. Kohlmorgen, 2007: 130) . For example, the existence of a relatively large HIV/AIDS department in WHO parallels UNAIDS; the World Bank has run its Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) since 2000, and remains a leading single donor in the fight against AIDS; UNDP has a program seeking to integrate AIDS priorities in poverty reduction strategies; and UNICEF has launched its Unite for Children Unite Against AIDS campaign. In short, "the existence of UNAIDS has not abolished rivalries between UN organizations and has not solved the coordination and cooperation problems" (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 138) .
The existing fragmentation opens up for "forum shopping" rather than coordination. When dissatisfied with one international organization or partnership, individual actors can turn to other organizations or create new ones. The creation of the Global Fund is an example. Certain powerful actors, including state governments, decided a public-private partnership would be better than UN agencies at allocating money to fight HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Paradoxically, the governments of a number of powerful states favored hybrid regulation, which entailed power sharing with other actors (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 131) .
In a way, the Global Fund itself has then become the victim of forum shopping, as donor governments sidestep the Fund and rely increasingly on bilateral funding. Significantly, after playing a crucial role in creating the Fund, the US government in 2004 launched its bilateral President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The reason may have been that the hybrid regulation of a PPP led to a more prominent role for NGOs than the US government had anticipated or desired (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 132) .
As for vertical coordination, several observers have pointed to the lack of congruence between global programs and local implementation. As NGOs play an increasingly prominent role both in the formulation of programs and, in particular, in their implementation, this reflects to a large degree differences between global and local NGOs.
The global NGO order certainly presses its understanding of gender equality, human rights and community participation, but these interact on the ground with local understandings in ways that often differ from the paper trail international organizations leave in their mission statements. (Swidler, 2006: 273) The response to the pandemic "is broadly planned at the international level while implementation relies on a set of fragmented organisations" (Seckinelgin, 2008: 42) . The Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs), created at the behest of the Global Fund, were designed to replicate the coordination potentials of PPMs at the national level. As mentioned earlier, CCM consultations have been poorly structured, and NGO participation has been uneven. In addition, UNAIDS and the World Bank, for their part, have encouraged the creation of National HIV/AIDS Councils (NACs) at the national level. The establishment of an NAC is a precondition for receiving loans and grants through the World Bank's MAP. Reviews of MAP have concluded that NACs "are not providing consistent leadership and oversight" (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 139) . Moreover, there is a lack of coordination between CCM public-private partnerships and government-based NACs, as well as considerable uncertainty as to which should be the leading body in the national response to AIDS (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 139) .
In response to this fragmentation and lack of coordination horizontally as well as vertically, UNAIDS in 2003 tried to enhance harmonization through "The Three Ones" initiative, emphasizing the necessity of (1) one coordinating framework for all global partners, (2) one national coordinating authority, and (3) one country-level monitoring and evaluation system. A Global Task Team, a multi-stakeholder initiative established in 2005, concluded that, rather than meeting these requirements, the UN system's response remains unevenly coordinated and characterized by duplication, especially at the national level (Kohlmorgen, 2007: 140-41) .
Representation
The inclusion of civil society and private sector delegates in PPPs raises the question of how representative they can be. For example, early on the WHO GPA tried to set up a forum through which major NGOs could liaise with GPA. It failed, in large part due to unresolved issues of representation. First, the predominance of US and European NGOs led to a North-South split. Second, the general difficulties of selecting a few organizations as representatives of the variegated NGO community precluded the establishment of a formal coordinating body (see Gordenker et al., 1995: 89-108; Söderholm, 1997: 160-64) .
UNAIDS inherited these difficulties. The choice of NGO members on the Program Coordinating Board (PCB) was made by the three official NGO observers at the GPA Management Committee.
While they made huge efforts to consult significant networks across the world there has been some discontent (both within the community sector and the cosponsoring agencies) with the process and actual choice of NGO delegates, although no one has proposed a significant alternative way of doing it. (Altman, 1999: 4) Activist groups, speaking on behalf of PLWHA, such as ACT UP, denounced the lack of representativeness, which only further underscores the dilemmas of NGO representation in PPPs.
The various "networks" that were consulted in selecting the NGO delegates are in most cases not themselves democratic; more often they are peak bodies made up of people from a wide range of organisations chosen through a range of devices. At international conferences their voices tend to be less heard than that of groups such as ACT UP, whose style of direct confrontation is very effective in the presence of television cameras, but whose claim to representativeness is limited to the immediate participants. (Altman, 1999: 5) Although there seems to be no realistic alternative to co-optation processes of some kind, the Global Fund, as we have seen, took great pains in making its board representative along several dimensions. There is a North-South balance, affected communities are represented, as are the three types of nongovernmental partners (NGOs, companies, foundations) . In view of this delicate representational balance, it is noteworthy that civil society representatives on the board by and large have come from the HIV/AIDS area, whereas tuberculosis or malaria specialization has been mostly absent from the board (Bartsch, 2007: 152-53) . At the national level, CCMs are generally much less representative than the GFATM board. Civil society organizations are insufficiently represented. In particular, affected communities and women's organizations are underrepresented, reducing the legitimacy of CCMs (Bartsch, 2007: 155-56) .
As for the private sector, company representatives in HIV/AIDS PPPs seem to be co-opted according to unrevealed criteria. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has a seat on several boards by virtue of its large share of the total funding. The UN family is unevenly represented. While co-sponsors of UNAIDS, UN agencies are reduced to non-voting members of the Global Fund, and occupy less prominent positions in other PPPs. It has been argued that participation in PPPs tends to weaken the role of UN agencies, as control and authority are transferred to the steering groups of PPPs, in which the private sector plays a more prominent role. Private sector involvement in its activities may undermine the UN's credibility, impartiality and integrity and erode its goodwill among those who favor traditional interstate multilateralism (cf. Buse and Walt, 2000b: 707) .
In sum, for partnerships representation remains a knotty problem, for which there is no obvious solution. Yet failure to achieve an acceptable level of representativeness reduces the legitimacy of PPPs.
Accountability
Both the public and the private sector have well-established mechanisms of accountability. In the public sector, civil servants are accountable to governments which, in turn, are accountable to voters in democracies. In the private sector, management is accountable to shareholders. Internationally, accountability becomes less straightforward. IGOs are formally accountable to member states. But the question "accountable to whom?" has no unequivocal answer when applied to NGOs or PPPs. Are PPPs accountable to those who are affected by their action, as NGO partners typically argue, or to those entrusting them with power, as donor governments and other partners tend to propose? Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane (2005) refer to this differentiation as a "participation" and "delegation" model, respectively.
The inclusion of NGOs in global health PPPs is usually legitimized in terms of democracy and efficiency. NGOs ensure that the voices of affected populations are heard and their needs reflected in global policies; and they have a comparative advantage in delivering health interventions, especially to hard-toreach or vulnerable populations (Doyle and Patel, 2008: 1931) . This implies accountability to those affected by PPP actions.
Skeptics dismiss this depiction as too idealized. They point to weak links between global NGOs represented in PPPs and community-based NGOs, arguing that the latter have been crowded out by a growing number of "operational" NGOs with few links to the communities they serve (Seckinelgin, 2005; Doyle and Patel, 2008: 1934) . The dependence of most NGOs on donor funding and the pressure to achieve quick result have led to homogenized approaches, favoring interventions which can be easily measured but which often lack credibility and trust within affected communities. Moreover, Western donor governments and the Global Fund, some argue, channel funds to NGOs in order to bypass inefficient, ineffective and sometimes corrupt public sector agencies in developing countries. Their support of NGOs thus confers spurious legitimacy on the actions of donor governments and PPPs (cf. Doyle and Patel, 2008: 1932-34) . And whereas NGOs are sometimes seen as monitoring the operations of international organizations and challenging the elitist "club model" of global governance, critics claim that "it is by not challenging the international policy framework that NGOs have a significant role" (Seckinelgin, 2005: 359) .
All this suggests that NGOs are more accountable to donors than to affected communities. In any event, "downward accountability" is generally weak, and particularly limited when global as well as local organizations are involved (cf. Buse and Walt, 2000b: 705) . The limited accountability mechanisms and transparency of NGOs themselves contributes to this weakness (Doyle and Patel, 2008: 1933 ).
Yet a "delegation" model of accountability is no less problematic for PPPs in the HIV/AIDS field. One may argue that the co-sponsoring UN agencies have delegated authority to UNAIDS and therefore can hold it to account. But who has delegated authority to the Global Fund and other PPPs? All the partners? Agents with so many principals are not easily held to account. In the case of the Global Fund, one single partner, the US government, has exercised its right to hold GFATM to a set of standard and judge whether these have been fulfilled.
In 2003, the US Congress directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to monitor and evaluate the Global Fund every two years. Its 2003 report identified information-sharing and lacking civil society participation in CCMs as prominent problems. In 2005 GAO lamented insufficient documentation of performance-based funding decisions and the poor quality of recipients' self-reported performance data. While acknowledging that GFATM had improved its documentation, the 2007 report pointed to the importance better risk management and oversight of the performance of local fund agents (Panos, 2003: 32; GAO, 2007) . In its response, the Global Fund welcomed "the constructive and forward looking recommendations" and committed to their implementation (GAO, 2007: 39) .
If the strongest donor government has thus marked its role in holding GFATM accountable transparently, the role of companies and foundations remains opaque. Does the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the leading private donor, have mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation? If so, how do they relate to US oversight in terms of content and influence?
In sum, AIDS PPPs seem to conform with Ilona Kickbusch's (2005: 972) general conclusion that "at present there is no mechanism whereby the various actors within the pluralist global health system are held to account." Nor are there any mechanisms of sanctions that could be applied to failing or negligent PPPs, beyond the "forum shopping" of powerful partners.
Conclusions
After more than twenty years of global advocacy, government commitments, new organizational forms and millions of dollars in aid, frustration with the obvious lack of progress prevails in the fight against AIDS. In many developing countries, the epidemic is becoming generalized, the incidence of new HIV transmissions remains high, and only a fraction of PLWHA get adequate care and sustainable ARV treatment (cf. Strand, 2007: 217-18) . Public-private partnerships were originally seen as a means to improve effectiveness by coordinating disjointed efforts by an array of different actors. Instead, the mushrooming of PPPs has entailed fragmentation and duplication.
In view of the lack of tangible progress in the fight against AIDS, PPPs can so far count on only limited output legitimacy. This means that input legitimacy in terms of representation and accountability becomes crucial. Yet, as we have seen, PPPs are problematic on this score as well. Whereas this chapter has drawn a broad picture of some prominent issues, a more fine-grained picture requires further research comparing the modus operandi of several PPPs active in the HID/AIDS field. Specifically, we need to "learn more about what makes a partnership 'effective' and in particular, what organizational forms and management arrangements represent best practice for governance, accountability and representation, and what factors contribute to partnership effectiveness on the ground" (Buse and Walt, 200b: 709) .
